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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO CITIES
The municipal Council of the city of New York under authority
of the city charter investigated the Municipal Civil Service Commis-
sion. It served a subpoena duces tecum upon the Mayor in an effort to
secure the written report of a related investigation. The Mayor ap-
plied for an order to vacate the Council's subpoena. Held, the rec-
ords of the Mayor pertinent to the investigation-are not immune from
the Council's power of subpoena.1
The principal issue was whether the doctrine of separation of
governmental powers applied to municipal governments.
The classical strictness2 of this doctrine has been modified in
both federal3 and state4 application by modern decisions. However,
the principle of executive immunity from process by either of the
1. LaGuardia v. Smith, 288 N.Y. 1, 41 N.E. (2d) 153 (1942) (twojudges dissenting). An order of the Supreme Court, 176 Misc.
482, 27 N.Y.S. (2d) 321 (1941), denying the application was up-
held by the Appellate Division, 262, App. Div. 708, 27 N.Y.S. (2d)
992 (1st Dept. 1941), motion for leave to appeal denied, 262 App.
Div. 726, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 705 (1st Dept. 1941). Petitioner ap-
pealed with permission of the Court of Appeals.
The N.Y. City Charter (adopted November 3, 1936, by refer-
endum under authority of N.Y. Laws 1934, c. 867, effective Jan-
uary 1, 1938) §43 authorizes investigations by the Council and
§§5(3),803(1) authorize investigations by the Mayor.
2. ". . . that each department shall by the law of its creation be
limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate to its own de-
partment and no other." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,
191 (1880).
3. Ex parte Grossmann, 267 U.S. 87 (1924); Dreyer v. People of State
of Illinois, 187 U.S.-71 (1902). "The true meaning is, that the
whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised
by the same hands, which possess the whole power of either of the
other departments. . . . " Story, Const. (5th ed. 1840) 48. See
Willis, Constitutional Law of the U.S. (1936) 168, 169.
4. State ex rel. Patterson v. Bates, 96 Minn. 110, 104 N.W. 709(1905); Trustees of Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga
Gas, Electric Light and Power Co., 191 N.Y. 123, 83 N.E. 693(1908); Henrico County v. City of Richmond et al., 106 Va. 282,
55 S.E. 683 (1906); Sabre et al. v. Rutland Ry. et al., 86 Vt.
347, 85 At. 693 (1913). See Stockman v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 24,
129 Pac. 220, 223 (1912); People v. Kelly, 347 fI1. 221, 233,
179 N.E. 898, 903 (1931). See In re Sims, 54 Kan. 1, 37 Pac.
135, 137 (1894) (concurring opinion). Contra, Tucker v. State,
218 Ind. 614, 640, 35 N.E. (2d) 270, 279 (1941); State v. Shumaker,
200 Ind. 716, 164 N.E. 408 (1928). In these Indiana cases the
court gives a strict construction to Ind. Const. Art. 3, §1, which
expressly provides for separation of departments.
5. U.S. v. Burr, 25 Fed Cas. 187, No. 14,694 (C.C. Va. 1807); State
ex rel. Bisbee v. Drew, 17 Fla. 67 (1879); People ex rel. Sutherland
et al. v. Governor, 29 Mich. 320 (1874); Donnelly v. Roosevelt,
governor, 144 Misc. 687, 259 N.Y.S. 355 (1932); People ex rel.
Broderick v. Morton, 156 N.Y. 136, 50 N.E. 791 (1898). All these
cases base the principle of executive immunity upon the doctrine
of separation of powers.
6. Humphrey's Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Springer v.
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1927); Willis, Constitutional
Law of the U.S. (1936) 133.
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other departments still prevails.5  In the federal government 6 and
in state governments 7 where no express separation is provided by
constitution, the doctrine of separation of powers is implied from
the fact that separate departments are established. Presumably this
same implication could arise where municipal corporations are set
up with separate departments.8 Neither federal nor state constitu-
tions require tripartite departments in city government; 9 thus the
statute or charter could establish any desired form of government.10
However, the weight of authority holds that the doctrine of separation
of powers does not apply to municipal governments.".
In the reasoning of the courts, two theories for denying the ap-
plication of the doctrine are prominent. One theory holds that the
doctrine applies only where the government possesses sovereignty.
Municipalities are mere agencies of the state possessing no sov-
ereignty12 and, as such, their powers are strictly limited to those ex-
7. In re Sims, 54 Kan 1 37 Pac. 135 (1894); State ex rel. Young,
Attorney General, v. briil, 100 Minn. 499, 111 N.W. 294 (1907);
City of Zanesville v. Zanesville Telegraph and Telephone Co., 64
Ohio St. 67, 59 N.E. 781 (1901); Kimbal v. City of Grantsville
et al., 19 Utah 368, 57 Pac. 1 (1899).
8. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1927); Lehman, C. J.,
dissenting, "It seems to me clear that there is necessarily implied
in the grant of investigating power to each a limitation that
neither Council nor Mayor may encroach upon the field reserved for
the other." Instant case at 13, 41 N.E. (2d) at 158.
9. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Williams v. Eggleston, 170
U.S. 304 (1897); Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506
(1897); State ex rel. Thompson, Attorney General v. Neble, 82
Neb. 267, 117 N.W. 723 (1908); City of New York v. Village of
Lawrence et al., 250 N.Y. 429, 165 N.E. 836 (1929); Willis, Con-
stitutional Law of the U.S. (1936) 165.
10. Since state constitutional provisions for separation of powers are
held not to apply to cities, legislatures may set up city manager-
ship form of government, Sarlls v. State ex rel. Trimble et al.,
201 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270 (1929), or commission form of govern-
ment, Evkerson v. Des Moines et al., 137 Iowa 452, 115 N.W. 177
(1908); Bryan v. Voss, 143 Ky. 422, 136 S.W. 884 (1911); State
ex rel. Simpson v. City of Mankato et al., 117 Minn. 458, 136 N.W.
264 (1912); Barnes v. City of Kirkville, 266 Mo. 270, 180 S.W.
545 (1915); State ex rel. Baughn v. Ure, 91 Neb. 31, 135 N.W. 224
(1912).
11. State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Lane, 181 Ala. 646, 62 So. 31 (1913);
Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697 (1922);
Livengood et al. v. City of Covington, 194 Ind. 633, 144 N.E. 416
(1924); Baltimore and Ohio Ry. v. Town of Whiting, 161 Ind. 228,
68 N.E. 266 (1903); Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411 (1876);
Waldo v. Wallace, 12 Ind. 569 (1859); City of Spartanburg v.
Parris, 85 S.C. 227, 67 S.E. 246 (1910). See note 12 supra.
12. Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304 (1897); Mayor of Mobile
v. Moog 53 Ala. 561 (1875); Town of Petersburg v. Metzker, 21
Ill. 204 (1859); Scott et al. v. City of LaPorte et al., 162 Ind. 34,
68 N.E. 278 (1904); Attorney General ex rel. Nesmith et al v. City
of Lowell, 246 Mass. 312, 141 N.E. 45 (1923); City of St. Louis
v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547 (1869); Van Cleve et al. v. Passic Valley
Sewerage Commissioner, 71 N.J.L. 183, 58 Atl. 571 (1904); instant
case, 288 N.Y. at 12, 41 N.E. (2d) at 155 (1942). See also 1 Mc-
Quillin, Mun. Corp. (2d ed. 1940) 917; Cooley's Const. Lim. (7th
ed. 1903) 264, 265.
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pressly granted by statute or charter.' s The other theory relies upon
the fact that municipal governments have not kept the three depart-
ments separated in form or in practice, but have tended to intermingle
their functions. 14
The charter of New York City specifically grants to the Council
power to appoint special investigating committees to conduct investiga-
tions and take testimony under oath.' 5 Even in the absence of such
express authority, federal,' 6 state'7 and municipal'8 legislative bodies
13. City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil and Gas Co. et al., 250 U.S.
394 (1919); City of Worcester v. Worcester Ry. 196 U.S. 539 (1905);
Williams v. Eggeston, 170 U.S. 304 (1897); Loeb v. City of Jack-
sonville, 101 Fla. 429, 134 So. 205 (1931); Chicago Motor Coach
Co. et al. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22 (1929); East
Chicago Co. v. East Chicago, 171 Ind. 654, 87 N.E. 17 (1909);
Scott et al. v. City of La Porte et al., 162 Ind. 34, 68 N.E. 278(1904); State ex rel. Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Ry., 160 Ind. 45,
66 N.E. 163 (1903); Scenic Ry. v. McCabe, 211 Mic~l. 133, 178 N.W.
662 (1920); City of Richmond v. Null, 194 Mo. App. 176, 185 S.W.
250 (1916); Richmond F. & P. Ry v. City of Richmond, 145 Va. 225,
133 S.E. 800 (1926). See 1 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. [(2d ed. 1940)
910].
14. The mayor may be vested with legislative, executive or judicial
authority. Ford v. Mayor and Council of Brunswick, 134 Ga. 820,
68 S. E. 733 (1910); City of Greenville v. Pridmore, 86 S.C. 442,
68 S.E. 636 (1910); Walker v. City of Spokane et al., 62 Wash. 312,
113 Pac. 775 (1911). In many states the mayor is made a part of
the city council. Bartlett v. Dunscomb, 58 Cal. App. 610, 209
Pac. 74 (1922); Cochran et al. v. McCleary, Mayor, 22 Iowa 75
(1867); Brown v. Foster, 88 Me. 49, 33 Atl. 662 (1895); People
ex tel. Dafoe v. Harshaw, 60 Mich. 200, 26 N.W. 879 (1886). The
mayor is also frequently given powers as a magistrate. Uridias v.
Morill, 22 Cal. 474 (1863); Santo et al. v. State, 2 Iowa 165 (1855);
Baton Rouge v. Dearing, 15 La. Ann. 208 (1860); State ex rel.
Linden v. Davis, Mayor, 96 Ohio 301, 117 N.E. 358 (1917). Mayors
in Indiana cities of third, fourth, and fifth class may serve as cityjudge. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §48-1216, §48-1218, §48-1219,
and preside at meetings of the Common Council, Ind. Stat. Ann.(Burns, 1933) §48-1403.
15. N.Y. City Charter, §43, Smith v. Kern, 175 Misc. 937, 26 N.Y.S.(2d) 560, aff'd without opinion, 260 App. Div. 778, 24 N.Y.S. (2d)1,
aff'd. without opinion, 285 N.Y. 632, 33 N.E. (2d) 556 (1941);
Herlands v. Surpless, 258 App. Div. 275, 16 N.Y.S. (2d) 454, aff'd
without opinion, 282 N.Y. 647, 26 N.E. (2d) 800 (1939).
16. Sinclair v. U.S., 279 U.S. 263 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
U.S. 135 (1924), reversed on other grounds, Ex parte Daugherty,
299 Fed. 620 (S.D. Ohio 1924); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661
(1897); Wilkens v. Willet, 1 Keyes 521 (N.Y. 1864). See Landis
Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power of Investiga-
tion, (1928)) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 153.
17. Lowe v. Summers, 69 Mo. App. 637 (1897); In re Joint Legislative
Committe to Investigate Educational System of New York, 285
N.Y. 1, 32 N.E. (2d) 769 (1941); In re Doyle v. Hofstader et al.,
257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931); People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin,
248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928); People ex rel. McDonald v.
Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463, 2 N.E. 615 (1885); Ex parte Parker, 74 S.C.
466, 55 S.E. 122 (1906) ; State ex rel. Rosenheim v. Frear et al., 138
Wise. 173, 119 N.W. 894 (1909).
18. The power to legislate inherently carries with it the necessary
and auxiliary power of investigation, even in the case of muni-
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are held to have similar inherent power of investigation as a necessary
auxiliary to the legislative function. Since the doctrine of separation
of powers will not protect the Mayor from the Council's power of
investigation, 9 the only restrictions upon the exercise of this power,
assuming a legitimate purpose,20 are practical considerations of public
policy21
In Indiana, city councils have been granted power to conduct
investigations of city departments, officers and employees, in which
they may compel attendance of witnesses and production of books and
papers. 22 Furthermore, Indiana courts are in accord with the prin-
ciple that the doctrine of separation of powers does not apply to
municipal governments.23 Thus, the Indiana rule seems to be in accord
with the New York case.
cipal legislative bodies, regardless of the fact that they are not
part of a sovereign government. Herlands v. Surpless et al., 258
App. Div. 275, 16 N.Y.S. (2d) 454, aff'd without opinion, 282 N.Y.
647 26 N E. (2d) 800 (1939); Briggs v. Mackeller, 2 Abb. Pr.(N..) 30 (1855). Contra, In re Investigation of Contracts of
City of Albany, 113 Misc. 370, 184 N.Y.S. 518 (1920).
19. See note 13 supra.
20. Federal and state legislative powers of investigation are usually
held to be limited to the scope and purpose of possible future
legislation. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1924). Atty-
General Daugherty was later held not answerable to congressional
subpoena because the investigation was judicial in nature rather
than legislative. Ex parte Daugherty, 299 Fed. (S.D. Ohio 1924)
620. See Landis, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional
Power of Investigation (1928) 40 Harv.L.Rev. 153. It is sub-
mitted that this same limitation would apply to municipal legisla-
tive investigation, unless expressly otherwise provided.
The N.Y. City Charter, §43, limits the Council's power of
investigation to "matters relating to the property, affairs or
government of any city or of any county within the city."
21. Lehman, CJ., dissenting, "In final analysis the question to be
decided is whether there can be efficient government in which
there has been in large degree a separation and distribution of
power unless the powers so separated and distributed are deemed
exclusive." " .... to give another department the power to harass
or impede the chief executive is to invite disaster." ". . . . prac-
tical considerations and established traditions demand the rejection
of a literal construction of the charter which would give the
council the right and power to impede the chief executive officer of
the duty in the exercise of his executive powers." Instant case
288 N.Y. at 14, 41 N.E. (2d) at 159, 160.
22. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §48-1409. Since executive and
administrative authority m Indiana cities is vested in the mayor,
city clerk and other specified departments, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1933), §48-1501, it is submitted that the Common Council's in-
vestigating power extends to investigations of the executive de-
partments.
23. Sarlls v. State ex rel. Trimble et al., 201 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270(1929); Livengood et al. v. City of Covington, 194 Ind. 633, 144 N.E.
416 (1924); Baltimore and Ohio Ry. v. Town of Whiting, 161 Ind.
228, 68 N.E. 266 (1903); Waldo v. Wallace, 12 Ind. 569 (1859).
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